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437 
ON TREATING UNLIKE CASES ALIKE 
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF 
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.1 Cambridge University 
Press. 2017. Pp. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper). 
Frederick Schauer2 
Perhaps we should blame Aristotle. In his enduring 
discussion of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle offered 
the now-ubiquitous maxim that like cases should be treated alike.3 
Yet despite the fact that a raft of scholars over the years have 
exposed the almost complete emptiness of the “treat like cases 
alike” maxim,4 the maxim persists,5 often blinding those who use 
it, or see it applied, to the way in which some substantive criterion 
 
 1. Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. 
 2. David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia. This paper was prepared for the symposium honoring and discussing Randy 
Kozel’s Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent, held at the University of Richmond 
School of Law on April 20–21, 2018. 
 3. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA 5.1131a10–b15 (W. D. Ross trans., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1925) (c. 350 B.C.E.). See also ARISTOTLE, MAGNA MORALIA 1.1193b–1194b 
(W. D. Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (n.d.); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 3.1280a8–16, 
1282b18–23 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946) (c. 350 B.C.E.); W. VON 
LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE: HIS POLITICAL ARGUMENT (1985). 
 4. E.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: 
MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 136–56 (2001); H. L. A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 159 (Penelope A. Bulloch et. al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (1961); DAVID 
LYONS, On Formal Justice, in MORAL ASPECTS OF LEGAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON LAW, 
JUSTICE, AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 13 (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF 
FREEDOM 239–44 (1986); Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, 
Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031 (1996); Adam M. Samaha, 
Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2009); Peter Westen, The 
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating 
Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1974); Ben Johnson & Richard Jordan, Should Like 
Cases be Decided Alike? A Formal Analysis of Four Theories of Justice (Feb. 21, 2018) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127737. My own contributions to this literature are Frederick 
Schauer, Precedent, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 123 
(Andrei Marmor ed., 2012); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). 
 5. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1, 74 
(2012); Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 
948 (2009). 
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of likeness is necessary in order to make the maxim anything other 
than a largely useless tautology.6 Given that any two items in the 
world share some but not all of the properties of the respective 
items, any two items can be deemed alike in some respects and 
unalike in others, thus making the mere idea of likeness or 
unlikeness singularly unhelpful. 
Despite the necessity of locating some criterion of similarity 
(and, conversely, of dissimilarity) in order to fill in this 
fundamental emptiness of the “treat like cases alike” maxim, the 
maxim has far too often served as one of the principal 
justifications for a regime of precedent,7 a regime in which 
decision-makers have an obligation to follow previous “like” 
decisions even if and when they find those decisions mistaken.8 
But although there may be rare instances in which the question 
presented to a current court is genuinely identical to the question 
presented to the same court on some previous occasion,9 those 
instances are sufficiently rare as to make the “treat like cases 
alike” maxim an unsatisfactory basis for a norm or regime of 
precedential constraint. Rather, such a norm or regime is 
important when, in the interests of stability, predictability, 
decision-maker constraint, or, perhaps most importantly, systemic 
integrity or internal coherence, the norm (presumptively10) 
 
 6. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 199–
223 (2003). To the same effect, although more obliquely, are HANS KELSEN, Aristotle’s 
Doctrine of Justice, in WHAT IS JUSTICE? JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR 
OF SCIENCE 110–136 (1957), and RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: 
TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 112–13 (1961). 
 7. See, e.g., RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 4 (3d ed., 1977); NEIL 
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 73–99 (1978); Alfonso Ruiz 
Miguel, Equality Before the Law and Precedent, 10 RATIO JURIS 372 (1997). An important 
rejoinder is LYONS, supra note 4. 
 8. On the importance of understanding that a genuine argument from precedent is 
not dependent on the precedent-follower’s belief in the correctness of the precedent 
decision, see Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015); WASSERSTROM, 
supra note 6, at 52. 
 9. See Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1113 (5th Cir. 1997) (Garza, 
J., concurring) (regretting that he was compelled by a directly applicable precedent to 
make a decision he believed was “inimical to the Constitution”). 
 10. In theory, the force of a precedent might be conclusive, such that ignoring (or 
overturning) a precedent was simply impermissible. This may well have been English 
practice prior to 1966, when the view was that a court could not overrule or override even 
its own precedent—that was for Parliament to do, and not even for the court that had 
originally decided it. This understanding of the infinite weight of a precedent was changed 
with the famous 1966 Practice Statement (see CROSS, supra note 7, at 109–13; R. W. M. 
DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 127 (5th ed., 1985)), and Great Britain has now joined the rest of 
the common law world in considering even plainly applicable precedents as presumptive 
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requires decision-makers to ignore even relevant differences, and 
thus to treat unlike cases alike. Or so I will suggest here, and in 
doing so I will be using Randy Kozel’s important justification for 
a precedential regime as the platform for my analysis. 
I. 
In defending the desirability of a regime of stare decisis—
horizontal precedent11—for the Supreme Court of the United 
States, Kozel offers an account that is generally more normative 
than descriptive.12 As a matter of empirical description, strong 
precedential constraint has rarely characterized Supreme Court 
decision-making.13 Saul Brenner and Harold Spaeth’s 
wonderfully titled Stare Indecisis14 captures well the conclusion of 
 
and not absolute. Nevertheless, if the presumptivity of a precedent does not require that 
there be better reasons for overriding, ignoring, or overruling a precedent than there would 
have been for reaching a different result in the first instance, then the precedential force 
of a presumptive precedent disappears. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW 
AND IN LIFE 181–87 (1991); WASSERSTROM, supra note 6, at 52–53. 
 11. On the distinction between vertical precedent (the obligation of judges to follow 
the decisions of those above them in the judicial hierarchy) and horizontal precedent (or 
stare decisis), and the obligation of judges to follow the previous decisions of their own 
court, even when that court is now populated by different judges, see FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 
36–41 (2009) [hereinafter, SCHAUER, THINKING]; Larry Alexander, Constrained By 
Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989).  
 12. Kozel describes Chapter 1 of his book as, in part, “descriptive” (p. 7), but Chapter 
1 is in reality a description of the history, theory, and doctrine of precedent. It is not a 
description of the extent to which that theory and doctrine actually influence judicial 
decisions. 
 13. Much of the empirical research is summarized in Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis 
and the Selection Effect, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 121 
(Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013) [hereinafter PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT]; Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme 
Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381 (2007).  
 14. SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF 
PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946–1992 (1995). See also HAROLD J. SPAETH & 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT 
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence 
of Stare Decisis on the Votes of Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971 (1996). The 
empirical literature on the role of precedent in the Supreme Court is large and growing. 
An important overview and analysis is THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS, THE 
POLITICS OF PRECEDENT IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2006). See also the various 
contributions in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, supra note 13. 
For more subtle analyses of the role played by precedent, especially in courts other than 
the Supreme Court of the United States, see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 
43–51 (2008); Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 369 (2005); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing 
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most empirical studies of Supreme Court decision-making—that 
although the Court’s opinions are replete with alleged reliance on 
earlier decisions, and although most of the Justices most of the 
time purport to be constrained by precedent in reaching their 
conclusions,15 in fact stare decisis only rarely constrains and only 
rarely explains Supreme Court outcomes, whether for the Court 
as a whole or for individual Justices.16 There are, of course, 
exceptions to this generalization. Justice Potter Stewart’s 
concurrence in Roe v. Wade,17 seen in light of his dissent in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,18 can only be understood, as Justice 
Stewart made clear in his Roe opinion, as largely dictated by his 
acceptance of the precedential force of a decision with which he 
disagreed. And so too with some number of criminal procedure 
decisions over the years by Justices John Harlan,19 Byron White,20 
and Anthony Kennedy.21 But such cases are the exceptions and 
not the rule, and in general the justices appear to have been, for 
 
Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 
(2005). 
 15. A large part of the empirical problem in identifying the force of precedent is that 
the typical reference in a Supreme Court opinion to the importance of precedent or stare 
decisis is offered by a Justice who in fact agreed with the earlier decision. City of Akron v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), e.g., is offered by Justices who 
were not on the Court at the time of the original decision and thus may well have agreed 
with the earlier decision as a matter of first order substance, e.g., Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, 
Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.), or is cursorily acknowledged and dismissed in the course of a 
Justice’s refusing to follow an earlier decision. E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. 
v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2012). 
 16. See references in note 14, supra. See also the unfortunately neglected Maurice 
Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 227 (1985). 
 17. 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 18. 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 19. See Henry J. Bourguignon, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: His Principles of 
Judicial Decision Making, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 251, 279 (1979). 
 20. Compare Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (White, J., for the Court), with 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J., 
& White, J.). On the genuine precedential force of Miranda, see also Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Although Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court 
sounds in precedential constraint, the issue is complicated by the Court’s obvious desire in 
Dickerson to reaffirm its own interpretive authority, and, indeed, supremacy, against 
congressional encroachment—against Congress’s claim that it has the authority to overrule 
the Court’s constitutional decisions. 
 21. Compare Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring), 
with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 524 (2000) (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., & Breyer, J.). 
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generations, far better at announcing the importance of precedent 
than they have been in actually being constrained by it.22 
Kozel, however, is far less concerned with describing 
Supreme Court practice than he is in prescribing what it ought to 
be. And here he offers an important argument for stare decisis as 
a second-best coordinating device for achieving legal consistency 
against the background of disagreements among the Justices (and 
among courts) across time and among the Justices within 
particular courts (pp. 45-49, 171-172). If the Justices were willing 
to suppress their own individual views in deference to what has 
been decided before and decided over time, Kozel argues, the 
Court would be better able to achieve that degree of cross-
individual, cross-court, and cross-temporal consistency that is so 
vital, he believes, to the Court’s sociological legitimacy.23 
Kozel wisely recognizes that his normative account of the 
value of adherence to precedent hinges on an understanding of 
what is a precedent for what—of what potential decisions in the 
case now before a court in fact fall under the umbrella of some 
past decision, and thus undergird the consistency across decisions 
that is the hallmark of precedential constraint. And here Kozel 
offers an account that relies substantially on the distinction 
between holdings and dicta (pp. 70-94), making his account in 
significant ways traditional.24 There is nothing wrong with being 
in the vicinity of the traditional account, of course, however much 
Legal Realist commentators on precedent have been disturbed by 
 
 22. As noted above, supra note 20, a somewhat more complex example is Dickerson, 
530 U.S. at 428. It is true that at least some of the Justices who joined the Court’s opinion 
disallowing a congressional attempt to overrule Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436, would likely have 
been dissenters in Miranda had they been on the Court at the time, but the Court’s 
assertion of judicial interpretive supremacy in Dickerson likely provided an important 
justification for refusing to allow congressional overruling, the Court’s references to stare 
decisis notwithstanding. Dickerson thus involved three different desiderata—adhering to 
past decisions, making the right decision as a matter of first-order constitutional substance, 
and reaffirming the Court’s role as interpreter of the Constitution—that in this and other 
cases are likely in conflict.  
 23. For a valuable description and application of the venerable distinction between 
sociological and moral (or political) legitimacy, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND 
LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 155–74 (2018); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy 
and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005). See also Deborah Hellman, The 
Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107 (1995). 
 24. See CROSS, supra note 7, at 38–102; EDMUND M. MORGAN, INTRODUCTION TO 
THE STUDY OF LAW 155 (1948); EDWIN W. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND 
IDEAS OF THE LAW 300–10 (1953); EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES (2d ed., 
1894); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 62–68 (10th ed., 1978). 
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the traditional account. The Realist picture of precedent, which 
includes contributions by Jerome Frank,25 Herman Oliphant,26 
and Karl Llewellyn,27 among many others,28 and which reaches its 
pinnacle of sophistication in Edward Levi’s An Introduction to 
Legal Reasoning,29 is largely focused on the ability of judges in the 
case before them—the instant case—to locate something in the 
vast array of available precedent cases30 that will justify the instant 
case judge’s outcome preference, a preference that, according to 
the Realists, is determined for reasons standing apart from and 
typically predating the precedents.31 According to the Realist 
picture, therefore, precedent is largely about law-creation or 
about the manifestation in legal terminology of first-order 
outcome preferences rather than being about constraint by law. 
The Realist picture of precedent, like much of the Realist 
program more generally, is far more empirical than normative.32 
 
 25. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
 26. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159 (1928). A 
particularly valuable historical and jurisprudential analysis of both precedent 
traditionalists such as Wambaugh and precedent Realists such as Oliphant is Charles W. 
Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 771 (1988). 
 27. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 124–25 (Frederick Schauer 
ed., Univ. Chicago Press 2011) (1938–1939). Somewhat more guarded is KARL 
LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 68–69 (Michael Ansaldi trans., Paul 
Gewirtz ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1989) (1928–1929) [hereinafter, LLEWELLYN, CASE LAW 
SYSTEM]. See also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contracts, 47 
YALE L.J. 1243, 1244–46 (1938). See generally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN 
AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 203–69 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) (1973). 
 28. See FELIX S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 33–40 (1933); 
BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 107–09 (2007). 
 29. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (Univ. Chicago 
Press 2013) (1949). 
 30. It is worth noting that the Realist challenge to traditional views about the 
constraining force of precedent has two distinct prongs. One is the claim that individual 
precedents are written in vague and/or non-canonical language and are thus malleable in 
subsequent cases. See LLEWELLYN, CASE LAW SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 3–4. The other 
is that common law systems, and especially in federal systems such as the United States, 
offer an enormous menu of potential precedents, thus giving judges the power to select 
which ones to use, a selection typically made, according to the Realists, on the basis of the 
judges’ outcome preferences. 
 31. See SCHAUER, THINKING, supra note 11, at 36–60. 
 32. LEITER, supra note 28, at 54–57; SCHAUER, THINKING, supra note 11, at 138–42; 
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 
(1995); Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303 (1927); Frederick 
Schauer, Foreword, in TWINING, supra note 27, at ix, xii; Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism 
Untamed, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 749 (2013); John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism 
and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979); John 
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Although prescriptions about how judges ought to decide cases, 
how they ought to justify their decisions, and how lawyers ought 
to advise their clients pervade Realist writings, much of this comes 
out of the Realist concern—hence the self-appellation 
“Realist”—to describe legal and especially judicial decision-
making as it actually exists. And thus the Realist view of what 
judges “really” do turns out to be not very much of an impediment 
to Kozel’s predominantly normative or prescriptive argument 
about what judges ought to be doing. Kozel is plainly not so naïve 
as to imagine that judges disinclined to follow precedent will be 
much influenced by his normative arguments. But he nevertheless 
likely believes that judges with broad antecedent sympathy with 
the very idea of precedential constraint will find his guidance 
valuable. More importantly, Kozel’s arguments might be 
understood as directed to that amalgam of judges, lawyers, legal 
scholars, casebook editors, pundits, bloggers, politicians,33 and the 
elite non-legal media, a group whose collective opinion about 
which forms of judicial behavior ought to be praised and which 
condemned not only reflect but also constitute the norms of 
judicial decision-making.34 And thus Kozel is best, and 
importantly, understood as offering a plea for the creation of 
precedent-based norms of legal reasoning and judicial 
justification, norms that might, or so Kozel can be understood to 
argue, be especially important in and for the Supreme Court of 
the United States.35 
 
Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case 
of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195 (1980). 
 33. And perhaps especially members of the United States Senate in judicial 
confirmation proceedings. 
 34. For the jurisprudentially inclined, the statement in the text might be understood 
as a reference to the sources of what H. L. A. Hart called the “ultimate rule of recognition.” 
HART, supra note 4, at 100–10. Just as the ultimate rule of recognition determines in a legal 
culture what counts as law and what does not, so too does the same diffuse amorphous 
process (see Frederick Schauer, Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?, 3 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 1 (2012); A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD 
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 77 (A. W. B. Simpson ed., 1973)) 
determine, at bedrock, which forms of legal argument, legal reasoning, and legal decision-
making will be considered valid or legitimate in a legal culture and which will not. 
 35. It is possible, however, that Kozel’s focus on the Supreme Court gets things 
backwards. Given the increasingly political makeup of the Court, the increasingly political 
nature of the selection and confirmation processes, and the ideologically charged character 
of much of the Court’s docket, expecting the Court ever to take precedent seriously on a 
regular basis may be little more than wishful thinking. In appellate courts with non-
discretionary and less pervasively ideologically salient dockets, however, including the 
United States Courts of Appeals, some state supreme courts, and all of the intermediate 
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II. 
Even apart from the more foundational Realist challenge, 
however, there do remain alternatives to the distinction between 
holding and dicta as a way of determining the scope of the 
constraint imposed by a precedent case. A few generations ago, 
for example, Arthur Goodhart challenged the prevailing English 
view that it was the ratio decidendi—the holding, more or less, or 
the reason behind the holding—that determined the ambit of 
application of an earlier precedent case.36 For Goodhart, the 
“meaning” of a precedent case lay not in its ratio, but rather in the 
material facts of that case, when combined with the earlier case’s 
result with respect to those facts, and Goodhart’s argument 
generated a lively debate.37 More recently, Larry Alexander,38 
followed by others,39 has insisted that precedents operate much 
like canonically formulated rules, and thus that it is the exact 
language of the earlier case that operates in rule-like fashion to 
constrain subsequent outcomes, at least for those judges 
committed to the very idea of precedential constraint. As with 
Goodhart’s in an earlier generation, Alexander’s arguments have 
themselves been the subject of criticism and subsequent debate.40 
These analyses and debates about the scope of a precedent 
are important, for unless we know what a precedent is we cannot 
begin to understand just how precedent operates and thus just 
why a precedential regime might—or might not—be desirable. 
Still, it is crucial to recognize that all of the competing accounts 
operate within the realm of what we might call non-identity. 
When a formulated legal question in the instant case is for all 
practical purposes identical to the formulated legal question in a 
 
appellate courts in states whose supreme courts do have discretionary dockets, a strong 
commitment to precedent may more often make more of a difference. 
 36. Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 
161 (1930). 
 37. See J. L. Montrose, Ratio Decidendi and the House of Lords, 20 MOD. L. REV. 
124 (1957); J. L. Montrose, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 587 (1957); 
A.W.B. Simpson, Notes of Cases, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 413 
(1957); Julius Stone, The Ratio Decidendi of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REV. 597 
(1959). Goodhart’s rejoinder is A. L. Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. 
L. REV. 117 (1959). See also Geoffrey Marshall, What is Binding in a Precedent?, in 
INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 503–17 (D. Neil MacCormick & 
Robert S. Summers eds., 1997).  
 38. Alexander, supra note 11; Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rule 
Makers, in COMMON LAW THEORY 27 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007). 
 39. Including myself. SCHAUER, THINKING, supra note 11, at 50–54. 
 40. See Grant Lamond, Do Precedents Create Rules?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2005). 
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precedent case, the constraints of precedent, when accepted by 
judges or other decision-makers,41 create a presumption in favor 
of deciding the same question the same way, even in the face of 
the instant court’s belief that the decision in the precedent case 
was mistaken. For example, if the question in some not-very-
hypothetical instant case is whether a state may, consistent with 
the Constitution, enact a total prohibition on abortion, then Roe 
v. Wade42 can be understood as a precedent case answering that 
exact question in the negative. It is not that the questions 
presented in the precedent and instant cases are similar, or that 
they are analogous. It is that they are the same question.43 Just as 
it would seem odd to say that your 2008 dark blue Subaru 
Outback is similar to my 2008 dark blue Subaru Outback—much 
more commonly you would say “I have the same car,” even 
though of course it is not literally or logically or empirically the 
same car—it seems odd to say that the 2018 question whether a 
state can completely prohibit abortion is similar to the question 
presented in 1973 in Roe v. Wade.44 No, the questions are not 
similar. They are the same question. 
Far more commonly, of course, the question presented in the 
instant case is not identical to the question presented in the 
precedent case, or perhaps the facts in the instant case are in some 
potentially relevant way different from the facts in the precedent 
case. When such differences exist, the issue then is whether the 
question in the instant case is relevantly similar—analogous45—to 
the question asked and answered in the precedent case, or 
whether the facts in the instant case are relevantly similar to the 
facts in the precedent case. But similarity is not identity, and thus 
a determination that the question or facts in the instant case are 
 
 41. Although not directly relevant to Kozel’s book or to this article, it is worth noting 
that both vertical and horizontal precedent may be part of the decision-making norms on 
non-judicial decisional domains. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office 
of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010). 
 42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 43. On the distinction between the same question and a merely similar question, and 
thus on the distinction between precedential constraint strictu sensu and reasoning by and 
from analogy, see Frederick Schauer, Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) is Not Totally 
(or Even Substantially) About Analogy, 3 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 454 (2008). 
 44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 45. Vast amounts have been written about analogical reasoning in law, some of it 
celebratory and some of it deflationary. An overview of the issues, as well as an addition 
to the array of conventional views, is Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, 
Expertise, and Experience, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (2017). 
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relevantly similar to the question addressed or the facts presented 
in the precedent case is a determination about which non-
identical questions (or issues, or facts, or whatever) will be treated 
as identical for the purposes of imposing or applying precedential 
constraint. 
The basic point, which should be controversial only for those 
who believe that there are natural similarities between different 
acts, different events, different artifacts, and different non-natural 
kinds, is that precedential constraint, if and when it exists, and if 
and when it ought to exist, is not about treating like cases as alike. 
On the contrary, precedential constraint is about treating cases 
that are somewhat alike and somewhat different as being alike for 
purposes of precedential constraint. It is about treating the 
similarities as relevant and the differences as irrelevant, and about 
deciding which similarities matter and which do not. Thus, 
identifying what is a precedent for what is about attributing or 
ascribing likeness; and it is not about discovering, locating, or 
unearthing likeness. Determining precedential similarity, and 
thus determining which different events or acts or questions will 
in spite of those differences be treated as similar, entails the 
question of what a decision-maker in the instant cases deems to be 
similar, and not about what is actually similar in some deep 
ontological sense.46 
III. 
Understanding that determinations of similarity are far more 
ascriptions than extractions allows us to reframe, but not to 
disagree with, Kozel’s normative argument for the adoption or 
reinforcement of a norm of stare decisis. At the heart of Kozel’s 
normative argument is the belief that different Justices may have 
 
 46. Once we understand that ascribing similarity for the purposes of precedential 
reasoning is largely about treating different acts, different events, different facts, and 
different questions as nevertheless similar, we can glimpse the relationship between the 
topic of precedent and the topic of legal fictions. See generally LEGAL FICTIONS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Maksymilian Del Mar & William Twining eds., 2015). Many of 
the classic fictions are not so much genuine fictions as fabrications as they are about 
consciously deeming things that are in some or many respects plainly different as 
nevertheless similar for some legal purpose, as with deeming corporations as natural 
persons for various legal doctrines, or deeming the child born of a married woman as the 
child of the marriage even if the husband was not the biological father, or deeming the 
island of Minorca as being in London for jurisdictional purposes, as in the famous case of 
Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1774) (see LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 18–
21 (1967)). 
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different views, different perceptions, different politics, and thus 
different outcome preferences. But by requiring those divergent 
Justices to follow the decisions in previous cases even when they 
disagree with them, Kozel argues, we dampen differences and 
disagreements both among the nine Justices sitting at any one 
time, but also across Justices sitting at different times, and thus 
across differently constituted courts. To use a slightly tendentious 
word, although a word that would appeal to stare decisis skeptics 
such as Justice Scalia,47 a regime of precedent in general and stare 
decisis in particular suppresses differences. And it suppresses not 
only irrelevant differences, but also, and importantly, relevant 
ones. There are plainly differences between abortion and 
contraception, but when Justice Stewart in Roe based his decision 
on Griswold48 for reasons of stare decisis (although he did not use 
the exact phrase), he is best understood as saying that abortion is 
to be deemed similar to—in the same category as—contraception 
despite the apparent differences between the two. 
For Kozel, this suppression of difference is, on balance, a 
good thing. Not only does suppression of even relevant 
differences produce the familiar virtues of precedent—reliance, 
stability, predictability, and their cousins49—but it also reinforces 
and increases the Supreme Court’s legitimacy. And it does so not, 
as some would have it, by sending out the (false) message that the 
Court discovers but does not make law.50 Rather, a strict stare 
 
 47. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 139 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The whole function of [stare decisis] is to make us say that what is 
false under proper analysis must nevertheless be held to be true . . . .”). For discussion of 
Justice Scalia’s views about stare decisis, more of which appeared in extra-judicial writings 
and speeches than in judicial opinions, see Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare 
Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1921 (2017); David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and 
Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699 (1991). 
 48. See supra notes 17–18, and accompanying text. 
 49. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE 
AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63–74 (2009). 
 50. For commentary on the position, often associated with Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), that the Supreme Court should 
promote through its opinions the view that constitutional law and the Supreme Court’s 
decisions are not dependent on the makeup of the Court, see Hellman, supra note 23; see 
also Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 911 (2018). But 
if the Court’s decisions in fact do depend heavily on the Court’s staffing at any particular 
period of time, then the position reduces to the claim that it is good for the Court’s 
legitimacy that the public remain unaware of the extent to which the pre-legal social, 
political, and moral attitudes of the Justices play a predominant (but not exclusive) role in 
determining the votes of the Justices, and therefore in determining the Court’s outcomes. 
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decisis regime would send out what Kozel sees as the (true) 
message that the Court, if and when operating under a regime of 
stare decisis, would in deciding cases of second (and more) 
impression be in fact discovering and bound by law, at least if we 
consider previously decided cases as law. 
Kozel’s more important and more novel message, however, 
is that a regime of stare decisis serves a goal closely related to 
Ronald Dworkin’s conception of integrity.51 “Integrity” is of 
course a term as slippery as it is vague, and this is certainly not the 
occasion or location for engaging in Dworkinian exegesis, but the 
basic idea here is that integrity is a form of coherence or 
cohesiveness among various different particulars. Consider, for 
example, the statement in the Declaration of Independence that 
“all men are created equal.” Putting aside, albeit only in this 
particular context, the reference to “men,” and putting aside the 
belief of the Declaration’s authors that “all men are created 
equal” was compatible with the persistence of slavery, the 
statement nevertheless was made against the background of the 
numerous ways in which people are not (and were not created) as 
factually or empirically equal. Some are smarter, nicer, fitter, 
more industrious, morally better, and much else than others, and 
the authors of the Declaration plainly knew that. But the 
ascriptive dimension of the statement is that people should be 
treated as equal not because they are equal in a descriptive sense, 
but despite the fact that they are not. 
This conception of grouping the dissimilar—of treating 
differences as irrelevant and treating the different as if they were 
similar—exists in numerous dimensions of life. Consider, for 
example, a pass/fail grading system. Even assuming, 
counterfactually, that some number of students actually fail when 
a pass/fail system is in place, it is still the case that there are great 
differences among those who receive passing grades. Some of the 
passes are better than others, perhaps even much better, but the 
very good passes and the barely passing passes all receive the 
same grade. There are often good reasons for such an approach, 
 
 51. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 400–03 (1986); see also RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 10–11 
(1996); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 260–64 (2011); RONALD 
DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 176–78 (2006); STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 101–
23 (3d ed., 2013). 
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but it is another example of treating unlikes alike for often 
valuable normative or institutional purposes.52 
It would not take very much imagination to add to these few 
examples, but the point should now be clear. Once we appreciate 
the extent to which a regime of precedent is about grouping 
dissimilar items, we can see that adopting a regime of precedent 
is about creating a community53 of decisions and community of 
decision-makers, just as the creation of any other community is 
about the suppression of differences among community members 
in the service of the advantages of community itself. 
IV. 
The account offered here is not a challenge to Kozel. Rather, 
it is an explication of what appears to be Kozel’s own justifications 
for stare decisis in the Supreme Court. Although Kozel puts the 
point in language somewhat different from mine, his argument 
about disagreement is entirely compatible with the account I offer 
here about difference more generally. Far too much of the 
literature on precedent generally and stare decisis in particular 
has been saddled for too long with the “treat like cases alike” 
paradigm, a paradigm that invites those who accept or follow it to 
imagine that they are identifying likenesses rather than creating 
them. The idea of precedent, whether vertical or horizontal, is 
fundamentally ascriptive and not descriptive, and the 
ascriptiveness—the act of “deeming”—enables those who make 
decisions under a regime of precedent to participate in the 
creation of a community of decisions. To call a group of similar 
decisions about dissimilar facts and dissimilar questions a 
“community” is perhaps more than a trifle metaphorical, but a 
community of decisions may bear some relationship to the 
existence of a political community in a less metaphorical sense, 
and thus also to a community of decision-makers. The community 
is not a community of like decision-makers making like decisions, 
but instead a community of unlike decision-makers with unlike 
views being compelled by a regime of precedent to make like 
decisions. The community of decisions and the community of 
decision-makers is thus an example and product of the treatment 
 
 52. I am grateful to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for suggesting the example. 
 53. On Dworkinian integrity as community reinforcing and community creating, see 
GUEST, supra note 51, at 101–23. 
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of unlikes as being alike, as Kozel has valuably helped us to 
understand. 
